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THE CHINESE REVERSE MERGER COMPANIES (RMCS)
REASSESSED:
PROMISING BUT CHALLENGING?
Qingxiu Bu*
ABSTRACT
A reverse merger is perceived to be a quicker and less expensive method of going
public than a traditional underwritten initial public offering, which many Chinese companies
have used to gain access to United States ("U.S.") capital markets. A string of fraud
allegations involving U.S.-listed Chinese reverse merger companies (RMCs) has unearthed
numerous regulatory loopholes, challenging the efficacy of the Securities and Exchange
Commission's ("SEC") supervision. This surge of securities lawsuits has come to exemplify
investor concerns with RMCs' accounting, audits and controls. The focus should have been
put on developing an effective cross-border audit oversight system to ensure integrity and
investor protection. The ostensible sovereignty issue and China's vague State Secrets Law
have stifled hopes of reaching an agreement on the joint inspection between the two
jurisdictions. The unreliability of the judicial remedies at the current stage protrudes the
imminence for the SEC and the Exchanges to impose more stringent listing standards, which
may be the only realistic measures that can be taken to restore the investors' confidence.
INTRODUCTION
A reverse merger provides a more economical and efficient access to the U.S.
capital markets. With the balance of commercial power shifting eastward inexorably, many
Chinese companies have gone public in lieu of undergoing the traditional initial public
offering (IPO). Recently, such a transaction has been the subject of increased greater public
scrutiny and regulatory focus because of serious accounting fraud allegations and
irregularities.1 Private securities class actions and the SEC enforcement proceedings have
been looming over many Chinese RMCs. The scandals highlight investor concerns with the
companies' governance and the audits' quality and adequacy, in particular the issue that the
companies' financial statements do not reflect their true financial situation. Allegations have
included charges of overstated assets or revenues and discrepancies between regulatory filings
made to the Chinese and US regulators. A significant number of China-based RMCs have
been suspended or even delisted from trading by the SEC as a result of discoveries of fraud.
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' See
SEC
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Reverse
Mergers,
at
3
(June
9,
2011),
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/reversemergers.pdf. See also PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD.,
RESEARCH NOTE No. 2011-Pi, ACTIVITY SUMMARY AND AUDIT IMPLICATIONS FOR REVERSE MERGERS
INVOLVING COMPANIES FROM THE CHINA REGION: JANUARY 1,2007 THROUGH MARCH 31, 2010, at 2 (2011)
[hereinafter NOTE No. 2011 -PI]; PuB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSTGHT BD., STAFF AUDIT PRACTICE ALERT No.
8, AUDIT RISKS IN CERTAIN EMERGING MARKETS, at 2 (2011).
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The U.S. regulators face formidable procedural and jurisdictional challenges in actually
prosecuting an action against entities located in China. This paper aims to address that thorny
issue by exploring the feasibility to parallel the US regulators' more stringent listing standards
with the potential cross-border joint oversight regime.
Part I provides contextual insights of the reverse merger and how the inherently
lawful vehicle has been abused by Chinese RMCs. Part 1i discusses the emerging lawsuits
initiated by both the SEC and investors against the perpetrators with respect to the prevalent
fraud and irregularities. Part III examines why the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board ("PCAOB") registered but China-based audit firms should not be immune from the
liability resulting from their involvement in the fraudulent scandals. Part IV highlights how
the recent rash of accounting scandals has raised the stakes for the SEC and PCAOB to work
out a protocol with their Chinese counterparts. In light of the PCAOB's invalid attempt to
seek an exterritorial joint inspection and the controversial test of the SEC's subpoena
enforcement action, Part V considers how the US regulators and the Exchanges 2 have been
"seeking to close the barn door before future livestock runs away with investors' money"3 and
justifies the tougher requirements prior to the RMCs' listing. A tentative conclusion is given
in the final part.
A.

The Reverse Merger and Its Major Concerns

Many Chinese private companies seek to access U.S. capital markets by acquiring
control of existing public companies. 4 In a reverse merger transaction, a Chinese private
company merges into a public "shell entity",5 which finally survives the transaction despite its
lack of meaningful assets or operations. 6 The shareholders and management of the Chinese
entity typically gain a controlling interest in the voting power and take over the board of
directors and management. As such, the reverse merger enables Chinese private companies
not to be subject to the lengthy and more expensive registration process of an underwritten
traditional IPO, but instead to quickly gain access to the public markets. 7 It is worth
examining the rationale of the transaction and the major concerns arising from the reverse
merger.

2

These are the three major U.S. Exchanges - the NYSE, NYSE Amex and NASDAQ.

' Francis H. Byrd, Proxy Access Heats Up for 2012, HARVARD L. BLOG (Jan. 17, 2011, 10:07 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/01/17/proxy-access-heats-up-for-2012/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2012).
4 See NOTE No. 2011 -PI, supra note 1, at 2-3. Normally, the Exchanges look to Exchange Act Rule 12b-2 to
determine what constitute a "shell company." Id. Over 600 private companies have "gone public" through
reverse mergers with shell companies, id. at 2. One in three U.S. reverse mergers involved a Chinese operating
company. Id. More than 150 companies are principally based in China Since 2007. Id. at 3. In 2010, 260
reverse mergers were completed, of which 83 deals inversed operating companied in Mainland China. Id.
' See Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8587, 4
(July 15, 2005).
6 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2007). A "shell company" is "a public
reporting company with few or no operations." SEC Investor Bulletin, supranote 1,at 1.
7 See Exchange Act Release No. 34-64633, § 5005(a)(35) (June 8, 2012); N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) § 101(e)(1);
N.Y.S.E. LISTED COMPANY MANUAL (CCH) § 102.01F(1), § 103.01E(1).
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1.

Rationale behind the Reverse Merger

There are many reasons why a company seeks a cross-border listing in a more
established stock market. On the one hand, a reverse merger may allow a private company to
go public which, otherwise, would never have been allowed through a traditional IPO. On the
other hand, it increases the private company's intangible value out of listing in a more
credible Exchange while crystallising the raising of capital.
(a) FacilitateRaisingCapitaland Enhance Intangible Value
Because they have access only to private forms of equity, many private Chinese
companies are facing difficulties in raising capital. On the other hand, public companies
potentially have access to funding from a broader pool of public investors. The U.S. capital
markets remain the first choice for most mainland Chinese companies seeking to raise
capital.8 "The bonding effect - that is, the commitment to abide by the standards and laws of a
strict investor protection regime - rewards companies located in [Chinese] markets without
developed investor protection regimes." 9 The listing in the U.S. signals to investors that its
management has the capacity to comply with higher governance standards than those
operating domestically. Within a more established legal and regulatory framework, Chinese
firms may virtually mitigate their weak governance regime by bonding to the better disclosure
and higher standards. Overall, the prestige and credibility in a U.S. listing is perceived to
increase a company's intangible value in the eyes of the public.
(b) Less Restrictive Mechanism to Go Public
The standard for going public is high in the U.S. Certain Chinese private companies
may not be able to conduct a traditional IPO because of legitimate issues ranging from such
concerns as integrity of management, accounting irregularities and exaggerated future
prospects.10 Those overseas companies legally domiciled in offshore havens, like the Cayman
Islands or the British Virgin Islands," should never have been allowed to list in America in
the first place. The onerous and critical procedures to underwrite a traditional IPO have
caused them to search for a more efficient and less restrictive route. A most attractive
' Elizabeth Fry, Investor Alert Over Suspect Chinese IPO Prospectuses, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/f669486e-2308-1 I df-a25f-00144feab49a.html#axzz29y7tJ6te. The primary
benefits a company enjoys from going public through an IPO is a large infusion of additional equity capital and
share liquidity, William Sjostrom, The Truth About Reverse Mergers,2 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L. J. 743, 744
(2008).
9 James R. Doty, Auditing in the Decade Ahead: Challenge and Change, HARVARD L. BLOG (Jan. 8, 2012,
10:03 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/01/08/auditing-in-the-decade-ahead-challenge-andchange (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
10 John J. Huber & Jennifer A. Hull, Scaling the Great Wall of Accounting Issues in Chinese Reverse Mergers,
FTI CONSULTING 1, 3 (2011), http://www.fticonsulting.com/global2/media/collateral/united-states/scaling-thegreat-wall-of-accounting-issues.pdf.
" See Sally Painter, Cayman's are Just Tip of the Iceberg, POLITICO (Aug. 9, 2012, 4:29 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0812/79507.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). Many multinationals have
made use of offshore havens, like Cayman Islands as one of the world's fvourite places for the seriously
wealthy to park their money. See id.
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alternative, i.e. the reverse merger, avoids the due diligence of a traditional IPO. 12 It presents
not only a valuable alternative, but also a legitimate way to gain access to capital for those
that cannot afford a full-fledged IPO. Some firms unlikely to attract venture capital or facing
a considerable wait for listings on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges can benefit
immensely from the quicker, cost-saving advantages. China has tightly restricted private
companies from buying stocks and bonds from foreigners directly, which has held off
exposure to the fluctuations of international financial flows.13 Only the most powerful stateowned enterprises (SOEs) can be allowed to do so. However, through reverse mergers, many
firms get around the restrictions to gain access to the Western capital market. Unfortunately,
it is the widespread allegations of fraudulent accounting that have put the Chinese RMCs
under fire. Recently, there has been an increase in the concerns with the visibility into, and
reliability of, some RMCs' financial statements.
2.

Chinese Companies under Fire for Accounting Fraud

The use of a reverse merger as a financing or going-public technique is a generally
accepted mechanism, as well as a more cost-effective and streamlined means for a private
company. Although there is nothing inherently wrong, many RMCs have taken improper
advantage of aspects of the reverse merger process. Significant accounting deficiencies and
other corporate governance issues have heightened the awareness of risks that can go along
with investing in Chinese companies. In particular, there is a heightened awareness with
regard to the RMC's governance structure, and the inaccuracy, and transparency, of its
financial statements.
(a) InaccuracyandNon-Transparency
When Chinese companies list, they earn a documented cross-listing premium for
bonding themselves to U.S. institutions and committing to U.S. compliance activities aimed at
protecting minority investors. 14 Anxiety has grown as a string of RMCs have been accused of
fraud with a particular regard to Chinese RMCs' related-party transactions. This caused the
RMCs' share price to drop, damaging investors who bought in at what they had considered to
be an artificially high price. Warning shareholders about the risks of investing in Chinese
RMCs, the SEC has launched aggressive enforcement actions to address the misuse of the
reverse merger as a vehicle to commit fraud, and also to prevent them from abusing the
regulatory process. Since the beginning of 2010, the SEC and the three Exchanges have
suspended trading, halted trading, or delisted the securities of at least 29 U.S.-listed Chinese

12

Reverse

Mergers

Offer

a

Strategic

Alternative

to

IPOs,

TOUCHSTONE

ADVISORS,

http://www.touchstoneadvisors.com/documents/PDF-Files/Reverse%20Mergers%20Offer%20a/2Strategic%
20Altemative/o2Oto/2OPOs/20-/2012.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2012). The legal and accounting fees
associated with a reverse merger are lower than for an IP. See id. There are no registration requirements under
the Securities Act of 1933 as there would be for an IPO. See id.
" See Daniel H. Rosen, The U.S. and China: Friends or Foes? - PartII, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE (Apr. 20,
2006), http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/contentlus-and-china-friends-or-foes-%E2%80%93-part-ii.
14 See Craig Doidge, George Andrew Karolyi & Rene M. Stulz, Has New York Become Less Competitive
Than London in Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign Listings Choices Over Time, 91 J. FmN. ECON. 253, 254 &
n.4 (2009).
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companies when significant concerns arose regarding the accuracy of their financial
reporting.1 5
These scandals have revealed that the RMCs' governance is inherently weak.
Substantial financial results, following an IPO, were allegedly significantly different from the
financial statements provided in their prospectuses. For instance, some financial figures have
been pumped up dramatically in the previous year before they applied for a stock exchange
listing. Although one of the keys to public confidence is transparency, 16 Chinese RMCs
appear to be reluctant to provide proper disclosure. The reverse merger enables them to avoid
the detailed disclosures required in an IPO. Investors may have little publicly available
financial information so as to make informed investment decisions. "International regulators,
lawyers, and auditors face formidable obstacles in getting clear-cut information on Chinese
[RMCs], let alone freezing assets or enforcing court orders if fraud can ever be proved." 17
Under the current depression in the capital market, it is crucial to call for much greater
transparency in RMCs' genuine financial situation.
(b) Deficient Process of Scrutiny
The use of reverse mergers has facilitated many Chinese companies to access the
strongest public markets, but through the channel of weakest enforcement. Normal-listed
companies are subject to stringent securities laws, with their books being relatively
transparent. Through a backdoor method that circumvents the scrutiny of a conventional IPO,
the widespread use of shell companies offer their owners a way to minimize regulatory
scrutiny, and thus the transaction is not subject to the same level of due diligence review. The
major concern is the absence of registration requirements under the Securities Act of 1933 18
and the related lack of detailed operational and financial disclosure, as well as the lower level
of scrutiny of the SEC review process.
The RMCs may take improper advantage of the remoteness of their operations to
engage in fraud, as their unique structure complicates the ability of the PCAOB and the SEC
to dig into the accounts of the resulting firms. The operating part of the RMC and the U.S.-

15Investigations and Litigation Related to Chinese Reverse Merger Companies Financial,Economic and
Accounting Questions, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 2 (July 26, 2011), http://www.comerstone.com/chinesereverse-mortgage-litigation/ [hereinafter Investigations and Litigation]. The SEC has recently suspended or
revoked trading in the securities of a great number of RMCs due to allegations of fraud and other regulatory
concerns, such as Heli Electronics Cor. (HELI), China Changjiang Mining & New Energy Co, (CHJI) and
RINO International Corporation (RINO). See id at endnote 15.
16 Sheila C. Blair, Lessons of the FinancialCrisis: The Dangersof Short-Termism, HARVARD L. BLOG (July 4,
2011, 10:32 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/07/04/lessons-of-the-fmancial-crisis-the-dangersof-short-termism.
17 Robert Cookson, Hazard Lights Flash on Road to Chinese Riches, FrN. TIMES, Jun. 16, 2011,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/e27f4814-983a-I Ie0-ae45-00144feab49a.html#axzz29y7tJ6te.
"' See Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933,
SEC. EXCH.
COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/regis33.htm (last modified Sept. 2, 2011). "Often referred to as the "truth in
securities" law, the Securities Act of 1933 has two basic objectives: [(i)] To require that investors receive
financial and other significant information concerning securities being offered for public sale; and [(ii)] To
prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities." Id.
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listed part are technically two separate legal entities.19 "The Chinese-owned part signs ...
contracts with the listed entity to transfer revenues in a way that allows the books of the two
[former] companies to be consolidated under U.S. [securities laws and] accounting rules. It's
a risky structure since the U.S. shareholders don't actually own the Chinese company. 20 The
lack of scrutiny presents a loophole resulting in potential fraud. The wave of scandals has
prompted a much deeper rethink about Chinese listing in the U.S. markets. It seems unclear as
to why the RMCs have been allowed to list prior to the potential problems being eliminated.
As an observer held, the Western accountants and underwriters have been too quick to bring
companies to market before they are ready.21 Inevitably, there has been increased scrutiny of
Chinese firms that gained access to U.S. equity markets via a reverse merger. 22 It is worth
examining how shareholders have been resorting to the U.S. courts against Chinese RMCs
and their auditing firms.
B. Emerging Litigation against US-Listed Chinese RMCs
With China's extraordinary economic growth, many U.S. investors have been
investing heavily in Chinese RMCs with the hope of gaining substantial returns. A spate of
collapse has cost them billions of dollars and has triggered shareholder litigation, as well as
U.S. regulatory probes. More proactively, investors have alleged widespread accounting fraud
and improper transactions, thus causing share prices to nosedive.23 Most firms have just
slipped into U.S. stock exchanges, bypassing the scrutiny of an IPO and a regular review by
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). They are simply not prepared for the
strict corporate governance standards, nor have they realized that the U.S. shareholders are
not as averse to litigation as their Chinese counterparts. "[U.S.] [s]hareholders are likely to be
much more rigorous in their examination of [the RMCs'] control regimes." 24 They contend
companies invented sham businesses, inflated revenue, or gave vastly different information to
U.S. and Chinese regulators. The lack of adequate risk control and proper understanding of
rules expose them to litigation risks. The number of securities class action fillings has risen
steadily against Chinese RMCs, 25 such as China MediaExpress Holdings Inc.,26 RINO

Paul Gillis, A Chinese Listing Fitness Test, WALL ST. J. ASIA,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904060604576570121071633988.html.
"9

20

Sept.

15,

2011,

id.

21 See id.
22

Investigations and Litigation, supra note 15, at 1; see David Barboza & Azam Ahmed, Muddy Waters

Research
Is a Thorn
to Some
Chinese
Companies,
N.Y. TIMES, June
9, 2011,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/muddy-waters-research-is-a-thom-to-some-chinese-companies/.
23 See The SEC Approves New Rules for Reverse-Merger Companies to Become Listed on the Major U.S.
Exchanges, PATTON BOGGS LLP (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.pattonboggs.com/news/detail.aspx?news = 1612
(last visited Dec. 28, 2012). "[S]hares of Chinese RMCs collectively fell approximately 50 percent during the
first six months of 2011." Id.
24 Byrd, supra note 3.
25 Securities Class Action
Filings: 2011 Mid-Year Assessment, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 13,
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse-research/201 1-YIR/Comerstone-Research-Filings2011 Mid Ye
arAssessment.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2011). In the first half of 2011, more than 25% of all class-action
lawsuits alleging securities fraud were filed against Chinese RMCs. Filings related to Chinese issuers increased
dramatically between 1 January and 30 June of 2011 with 25 such filings, including 24 filings associated with
reverse merger companies. Id.
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International 27 and Orient Paper, Inc.28 The plaintiffs, whose lawsuits reflect increased
shareholder scrutiny, have sought to recover damages for violations of U.S. securities laws,
such as Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.29
1.

Henning v. Orient Paper, Inc.

Through a reverse merger, Orient Paper, Inc. became a Nevada corporation with
equity traded on the N.Y.S.E. Amex in December 2007.30 The case was filed in the District
Court of Central District of California on January 28, 2011 31 The plaintiff alleged that the
RMC failed to disclose material party-related transactions with its main suppliers3 2 and
misstated its financials in its 2008-09 annual report.33 The financial statements were based on
alleged differences between the company's SEC and Chinese regulatory filings.34 It was also
alleged that a disbarred and unlicensed auditor had audited the misleading financial
statements.35 The Federal District Court rejected the RMC's motion to dismiss the complaint
that alleged that the company materially misstated its financial information in two filings with
the SEC.3 6 It is arguably the first time that plaintiffs have survived a dismissal motion
involving a Chinese RMC. In the denial of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint, Judge Valerie Backer Fairbank ruled that the plaintiffs adequately plead
a securities violation with particularity under Section 10(b), Rule I0b-5 under the Exchange
Act, Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act, and the heightened standard of the Private Securities
37
Litigation Reform Act.

This ruling signals the willingness of the court to hear reverse merger securities
fraud actions. Interestingly, the effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v.
National Australia Bank38 shows that investors value the U.S. enforcement of its laws on

cross-listed companies.3 9 A number of settlements seem to indicate the extent to which

Am. Consolidated Compl., McIntire v. China Mediaexpress Holdings, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00804-VM
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2011).
27 Class Action Compl. for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, Chau v RINO Int'l Corp., et al., No.
CVI0- 09517-RGK (PJWx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2010).
28 Am. Compl., Henning v. Orient Paper, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-05887-VBF-AJW (C.D. Cal. Jan 28,2011).
29 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); Houston Adair, Chinese Reverse
Mergers Raise Concerns, COLUM. Bus. L. REv. ONLINE (Sept. 19, 2011, 10:40 PM),
26

http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/ 1775.
30 Am. Compl., Henning v. Orient Paper, Inc., supranote 28, at 35-37.
31Id. at 1.
32Id. at 47

3 Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 51-60.
" Id. at 10.
36 Henning v. Orient Paper, Inc., No. CV 10-5887-VBF (AJWx), 2011 WL 2909322, at *1, *6 (C.D. Cal. July
20,2011).
37 Id. at *1-26; see Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ee (1998)).
"' Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S.Ct. 2869,2886 (2010).
'9 See Louis Gagnon & G. Andrew Karolyi, The Economic Consequences of the US. Supreme Court's
Morrison v. NationalAustralia Bank Decisionfor ForeignStocks Cross-Listedin the U.S. Markets, in SOCIAL
14
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Morrison may operate to reduce the magnitude of securities class action lawsuits filed against
non-U.S. companies, even those whose shares trade on U.S. exchanges.40
2.

Judicial and Procedural Hurdles

Whether shareholders are successful in efforts to obtain damages for the fraud will
likely have a significant impact on future investments in Chinese RMCs. The overall
cumulative impact of the Court's interest in taking up securities cases has been favorable to
RMCs and unfavorable to plaintiffs, and so to have the Supreme Court's recent securities law
decisions. The Janus Capitat and Morrison decisions represent significant defense victories
that have or will have a significant impact on a plaintiff's ability to pursue securities claims.
In September 2010, Judge Victor Marrero entered a significant ruling in In re Alstom SA
42
Securities Litigation,
in which he granted the defendants' motion, relying on Morrison v.
National Australian Bank. The Court dismissed the claims of the Alstom shareholders who
had bought their shares in the French company on a foreign exchange.43
In addition, lawsuits against the RMCs may pose unique hurdles and add expenses
to the defense of shareholder claims. Plaintiffs face numerous obstacles, such as difficulty in
pursuing evidence gathering in China, and limitations on their ability to collect judgments or
legal awards. Plaintiffs would have to look at the auditors' work papers and communications
with the company. The individual defendants, corporate documents, and key witnesses in the
RMC-related cases often reside in China. This makes it exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to
collect evidence against those entities which have either most of their operations in China or
legal homes in the Cayman Islands. Plaintiffs have complained that their cases have been
thwarted because of the difficulty of gathering crucial evidence from Chinese audit firms,
which partly results in the defense costs escalating rapidly. Furthermore, given that most
Chinese RMCs have limited insurance coverage, plaintiffs are always facing difficulty in
collecting judgments against entities which have primary operations in China. Not to mention
the thorny issue that U.S. courts' rules on evidence-gathering are often not honored. 44 With
the high surge of lawsuits against Chinese RMCs, the auditors are increasingly exposed to
special challenges, including fraud risks, due to their materially misleading or deficient
statements. Suits against audit firms may also find deeper pockets than the potentially nonresponsive, underinsured, and non-liquid Chinese RMCs themselves. Thus, many plaintiffs
seek a monetary judgment not against the company, but the auditor, which could pay large
judgements or settlements.

SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK, at 8, 17-18 (Johnson School Research Paper Ser. No. 50-2011, 2012), available

at http://ssm.com/abstract=1961178.
40 See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469,471-472 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
41 See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2298-2299 (2011).
42 See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
id.
44 Carlyn Kolker & Martin Howell, Analysis: Auditors Face Suits Over US-Listed Chinese Blowups, REUTERS,
43

June 9, 2011, available
idUSTRE75902L20110610.

at

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/10/us-china-auditors-lawsuits-
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C. Challenges: Should auditing firms be immune from the scandal?
China has become the biggest source of cross-border listings and mergers, where the
Big Four" have 45
been expanding rapidly. 46 A number of factors may undermine the auditors'
ability to undertake their auditing effectively. Foreign auditing firms are forbidden to set up
their own auditing offices in China and must operate through Chinese affiliates. This concern
has been aggravated since some small U.S. auditing firms may lack sufficient resources to
conduct adequate overseas audits, and to meet auditing obligations when a substantial portion
of the RMCs' operations are located in China.47 Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
requires an audit firm to be registered with the PCAOB,48 some accounting firms may not
have conducted audits or performed sufficient due diligence in accordance with PCAOB
standards. 49 Such small audit firms, which may not be familiar with accounting and auditing
principles for SEC registrants, are only inspected by the PCAOB once every three years. 50
They may have simply based their audit opinion on the work of unreliable Chinese auditing
firms, to which the audit had been outsourced. Some firms just lend their reputation by
signing off on books and records without verifying the accuracy, even if they do not have any
affiliates in China.51 As a general rule, the basic purpose of an audit is to give investors
insight about the financial position and viability of a company. Investors having suffered a
drubbing from accounting scandals at U.S.-listed RMCs would be looking to maximize their
recovery and to sue the auditors who blessed their financial statements. Some auditors have
52
found themselves targeted for alleged complicity in the misstatements.

4' These are the Big Four auditing companies: PricewaterhouseCoopers (now PwC), Deloitte, Ernst & Young,

and KPMG.
Dinny McMahon & Michael Rapoport, Challenges Auditing Chinese Firms, WALL ST.

46

J.,

July 12, 2011,

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052702304584404576439902614628750.html.
J. Henning, The Importance of Being Audited, N.Y. TIMES, June, 13 2011,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/the-importance-of-being-audited/.
48 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §102(a), 15 U.S.C. §7212 (2010). Accounting firms that audit public companies
must register with the PCAOB. See id.
49 PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., STAFF AUDIT PRACTICE ALERT NO. 6, AUDITOR
47 Peter

CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING USING THE WORK OF OTHER AUDITORS AND ENGAGING ASSISTANTS FROM

OUTSTDE THE FTRM 1 (2010).
50 PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., ACTIVITY SUMMARY AND AUDIT IMPLICATIONS FOR REVERSE

1, 2007 THROUGH MARCH 31, 2010 n.
4
(March
14,
2011),
available
at
http://pcaobus.org/research/documents/chinese-reverse merger research note.pdf.
U.S. registered firms
audited 74% of the Chinese reverse merger companies with the remainder being audited by Chinese and Hong
Kong registered firms. Id. There are 110 auditing firms in China and Hong Kong that are registered at the
PCAOB. PCAOB Announces Some Progress in Impasse Over Audit Oversight in China, 43 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. Online (BNA) No. 1720 (Aug. 15, 2011).
51 "After the SEC found that Moore Stephens Wurth Frazer & Torbett, LLP (MSWFT), a U.S.-registered
PCAOB accounting firm and auditor of several CRMs, had failed to follow professional standards, it issued a
cease and desist order against the firm. More than 24 CRMs subsequently announced auditor resignations."
Adair, supranote 29.
52 See Kolker & Howell, supranote 44.
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1.

Carlos Munoz v. China Expert Technology, et. al.

In this case, the plaintiff accused the auditors of failing to detect an alleged $132
million fraud carried out by the company.53 It was alleged that two units of PKF New York
and PKF Hong Kong had failed to verify the existence of 16 contracts to build government
computer systems in China, as well as failing to identify an overstatement of revenue and
accounts receivable in the audit.54 Two of the most contentious issues that are to be examined
below are whether the auditor could be regarded as the "maker," and how to strike a balance
between the policy of China and the U.S. Federal policy regarding the auditors' obligation.
(a) Maker
A most contentious issue arose as to whether the auditor should be liable for the
misleading or fraudulent statement. To prevail against auditors, plaintiffs must prove that the
auditors knowingly made false statements when issuing reports affirming a company's
financial statements.55 It seems indisputably clear that only the actual "maker" of an allegedly
fraudulent statement may be subject to a private securities claim. In Janus CapitalGroup Inc.
v. First Derivative Traders,56 the U.S. Supreme Court held that "the maker of a statement is
the person with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and
how to communicate it."'57 PKF New York's Motion to Dismiss cited to this, which limited
58
the exposure of advisers who assisted but were not the "maker" of a misleading statement.
Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein denied the Motion to Dismiss by the firm involving China Expert
Technology Inc., which had sold securities in the U.S. with a prospectus containing the PKF
audit opinion. 59 As to whether the defendant had "final authority" over the opinions before it
was signed and citing language in the engagement letter, the judge innovatively observed that
the allegations against the auditor "create genuine issues of fact as to whether [the defendant]
explicitly or implicitly controlled sufficiently - and thus 'made' - the statements in
question." 60 The judge held that discovery is required to determine such an issue. 61 Although
the Court did not rule on the merits of the case, it instead allowed shareholders' claims to

" Carlyn Kolker, U.S. Judge Allows Lawsuit Over China Audits, REUTERS, July 20, 2011, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/20/china-accounting-ruling-idUSN1E76JOCG20110720. See Munoz v.
China Expert Tech., Inc., No. 07Civ.10531(AKH), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128539, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(denying defendant PKF N.Y.'s motion to dismiss the fourth amended complaint).
14 Fourth Am. Compl., Munoz v. China Expert Tech., Inc., No. 07Civ.10531-AKH, at 9 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
55 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (2012).
56 Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S.Ct. 2296 (2011).
57 Id. at 2298.
58 Id.

'9 Munoz, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128539, at *2-5. The prior history of the motion to dismiss indicates how
courts may apply case law to fact patterns involving Chinese companies and accounting firms. Id. at *3. A
hand-written note by Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein in Munoz granted a rehearing on a motion to dismiss a
shareholder class action by PKF New York. Id. Rehearing was granted on the basis of the Supreme Court's
decision in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 131 (2011). See id. While
plaintiff's assertion of Janus was sufficient to gain a rehearing, the defendants' reliance on Janus did not win
the day on the motion to dismiss. Id. at *5.
60 id.
61

id.
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proceed to the next phase; the ruling is likely to have significant implications for other cases
over accounting problems of Chinese RMCs. Hellerstein's ruling signals a "potentially
62
lucrative channel for shareholders" to initiate lawsuits against auditors of Chinese RMCs.
(b) The China Law vis-a-vis The U.S. FederalPolicy
Another most controversial issue is whether a PCAOB-registered but China-based
audit firm is obliged to file an SEC report. The defendant argued that Chinese State Secrets
Law criminalizes the disclosure of information that relates to Chinese national security and
other potentially sensitive interests. 63 Nevertheless, the Court found that "the national interest
of the United States is observably strong; China's is speculative." 64 The judge cited the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling in Societe Nationale stating that "[i]t is well settled that [foreign
'blocking'] statutes do not deprive an American court of the power to order a party subject to
its jurisdiction to produce evidence even though the act of production may violate that
65
statute.

The Court also pointed out that the fact that China Expert Technology is obligated to
file disclosure statements with the SEC puts into question any claim that may arise under
China's State Secrets Law.66 It is essential to strike a balance between preserving the policies
of China's laws on state secrets, and U.S. federal policy in relation to accountants'
obligations. To look into the issue's insights, it is worth anatomizing how the SEC recently
brought a subpoena enforcement proceeding against an audit firm for obstructing a probe of
reverse merger transactions.
2.
A
auditors in
number of
accounting

62

63

SEC v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd.

series of alleged fraud in Chinese RMCs has spotlighted the roles of the Big Four
the fastest-growing market. The SEC has taken enforcement actions against a
reverse merger entities and their audit firms, alleging concerns regarding the
fraud contained in their public filings. In September 2011, the SEC sued the

Kolker, supra note 53.
Order Regulating Discovery, Munoz v. China Expert Tech., 07-CV-10531-AKH, 2011 WL 5346323, at *1

(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2011)[hereinafter "Munoz Discovery Order"]. See also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Baoshou Guojia Mimi Fa (
[Law of the People's Republic of China on
Guarding State Secrets] (promulgated by Order No. 6 of the President of the People's Republic of China,
September 5, 1988, effective Sept. 5, 1988),ch. 1,art. 1.
[S]tate secrets shall include the following: (i) secrets concerning major policy decisions on State affairs; (ii)
secrets in the building of national defence and in the activities of the armed forces; (iii) secrets in diplomatic
activities and in activities related to foreign countries as well as secrets to be maintained as commitments to
foreign countries; (iv) secrets in national economic and social development; (v) secrets concerning science and
technology; (vi) secrets concerning activities for safeguarding State security and the investigation of criminal
offences; and (vii) other matters that are classified as State secrets by the State secret-guarding department.
Id. at ch.2, art. 8.
64 Munoz Discovery Order, supra note 63, at *2. A balance test of "national interests" has been used to
determine such a finding regarding disclosure issues. Richmark Corp. v Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d
1468, 1476 (9th Cir. 1992).
65 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, S.D. Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n. 29 (1987).
66 Munoz Discovery Order, supra note 63, at *2
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Shanghai Office of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd. (D&T Shanghai) to enforce an
investigation subpoena involving Longtop Financial Technologies.67 The Cayman Islands
corporation, with its principal businesses in China,68 was listed on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) in 2007 for $17.50 a share. 69 The NYSE delisted the securities as soon as
the RMC was caught up in accounting scandals. 70 The PCAOB-registered D&T Shanghai was
the auditor and found it difficult to obtain independent bank confirmation of Longtop's
balances and major transactions. 7 1 After uncovering numerous improprieties during its audit
for the year ended March 31, 2011, D&T Shanghai abruptly resigned on May 22, 2011,
because it had identified numerous indictors of financial fraud at Longtop and further
indicated that investors could no longer rely upon its prior year audit reports. 72
"It is hard for investors to grasp how accountants can change their position
with no prior warning, disclosing serious reporting issues that call into
question the reliability of prior reports... It is worth considering whether
accountants should be asked to provide a more nuanced view of a
company's financial statements so that a sudden resignation or withdrawal
73
of prior opinions does not come as a complete shock to the market."
Apparently, D&T Shanghai's documents would reveal how any fraud schemes were
able to continue undetected for years at the RMC. On May 27, 2011, the SEC served D&T
Shanghai's U.S. counsel with a subpoena, requesting documents concerning its activities as
the auditor of Longtop from January 2007 to the date of the subpoena. 74 Such a request is
perfectly in line with the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd Frank Act), which enhanced the SEC's ability to obtain audit documentation held by
Chinese parties.75 Nevertheless, D&T Shanghai refused to comply with the subpoena on July
8, 2011, contesting the SEC's ability to compel an audit firm to produce documents predating
the Dodd-Frank Act and asserting that the production was prohibited under Chinese law.76 On
Application for Order to Show Cause and for Order Requiring Compliance with a Subpoena, SEC v.
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA, Ltd., No. 11-0512 (D.D.C. 2012); see Michael Rapoport, SEC Probes China
Auditors,
WALL
ST.
J.,
June
3,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304563104576361422372121248.html.
68 In re Longtop Fin. Tech. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2012 WL 5512176, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012).
69 Lynn Cowan, Longtop Financial Shares up 85% after U.S. IPO, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2007, available at
67

http://www.marketwatch.com/story/longtop-financial-shares-up-85-after-us-ipo.
70S.E.C. Asks Court to Force a Release of Papers from China, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2011,
http://travel.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/business/sec-asks-court-to-force-a-release-of-papers-on-longtop.html.
"' Inre Longtop Fin. Tech. Ltd., 2012 WL 5512176, at *2.
72 Press Release, SEC. EXCH. COMM'N, SEC Files Subpoena Enforcement Action Against Deloitte &
Touche in Shanghai (Sept. 8, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-180.htm.
7'Henning, supranote 47.
74 Press Release, supranote 72..
75 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 106, 15 U.S.C. §7216(b) (2010), amended by Dodd-Frank Wall St. Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 9290) (2010).
76William McGrath, SEC Ups the Ante in Subpoena Dispute with Deloitte Touche Shanghai by Filing an
AdministrativeProceeding Against the Chinese Accounting Firm ThreateningIts Ability to Appear Before the
Commission,

FED.

SEC.

L.

BLOG

(May

10,

2012,

12:47

PM),

http://www.fedseclaw.corm/2012/05/articles/Pcaob-news/sec-ups-the-ante-in-subpoena-dispute-with-deloittetouche-shanghai-by-filing-an-administrative-proceeding-against-the-chinese-accounting-firm-threatening-its-
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September 8, 2011, the SEC filed its Motion for an Order To Show Cause." The SEC sought
the Federal Court order to force Deloitte's Shanghai branch to turn over its work papers on
Longtop, with an attempt to enforce the subpoena in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia.78 On January 4, 2012, a court granted the SEC's Show Cause Motion requiring
D&T Shanghai to file a brief by mid-January 2012 and to appear at a hearing in early
February, thereby compelling D&T Shanghai either to concede jurisdiction by appearing at
the hearing or to risk default judgment. 79As a result, a magistrate judge in Washington, D.C.
has issued an order that permits the SEC to move forward on its request to require Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd. to turn over documents.80
The SEC's enforcement of the subpoena represents a milestone with regard to the
SEC's authority to "issue subpoenas to entities abroad."8 1 The case underscores the
difficulties of the U.S. regulators in probing the Chinese RMCs. The subpoena filed in the
U.S. District Court marks "the boldest move yet" by the SEC in its crackdown on the RMCs'
fraud8 2 The lawsuits have also escalated the diplomatic battle with regard to the U.S. auditor
watchdog's access to PCAOB-registered, but China-based, auditing firms. 83 The ruling is
largely procedural, but it does set in motion a round of briefing, and a hearing, to address
whether the SEC can compel the Chinese accounting firm to respond to its subpoena. It also
"has the potential to establish precedent ... when entities located abroad receive SEC
investigative subpoenas. 8 4 Notably, one of the reasons Deloitte asserted its refusal to comply
with the subpoena was the risk of sanctions under China's State Secrets Law,85 which is to be
examined below.

ability-to-appear-before-the-commission/#axzz2AbmTDbXJ. Although the regulators have not yet developed
plans for retrospective reviews of Dodd-Frank Act Regulations, it does apply retrospectively since 21 July
2010, when Dodd-Frank became law. Id. SEC should reinforce its commitment to these principles both
retrospectively and prospectively.
77 Press Release, supranote 72.

See SEC's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for Order to Show Cause and
Order Requiring Compliance with Subpoena, SEC v. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd., No. 11-0512
(D.C.Cir., Sept. 8,2011).
79 Memorandum Opinion and Order to Show Cause, SEC v. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd., No. 11-0512
(D.C.Cir. Jan. 4,2012).
78

80 Id.

"1 William McGrath, Deloitte Touche Shanghai Subpoena Case - Parties Take Differing Views on Procedure
to Resolve Dispute Over Whether the SEC Can Enforce Its Investigative Subpoena on a Chinese Accounting
Firm, FED. SEC. L. BLOG (Jan. 30, 2012, 11:38 AM), http://www.fedseclaw.com/2012/01/articles/secenforcement-cases/deloitte-touche-shanghai-subpoena-case-parties-take-differing-views-on-procedure-toresolve-dispute-over-whether-the-sec-can-enforce-its-investigative-subpoena-on-a-chinese-accounting-

firm/#axzz2A4npcl XG; see Unopposed Motion of Respondent Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd. to Vacate
Schedule Set Out in the Order to Show Cause and Require the Parties to Negotiate a New Schedule, SEC v.
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd., No. 11-0512 (D.C.Cir. Jan. 11, 2012).
82 Andrea Shalal-Esa & Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Takes China-Based Deloitte Unit to Court, REUTERS, Sep. 9,

2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/09/us-sec-deloitte-idustre78768r2O110909.
" See id.
84 William McGrath, D.C. Magistrate Judge Rules That Service by E-Mail of Show Cause Order on U.S.
Counsel for

Chinese Accounting Firm

is Acceptable,

FED.

SEC.

L.

BLOG

(Feb.

1, 2012),

http://www.fedseclaw.com/2012/02/articles/sec-enforcement-cases/dc-magistrate-judge-rules-that-service-byemail-of-show-cause-order-on-us-counsel-for-chinese-accounting-firm-is-acceptabe/#axzz2AbmTDbXJ.
85

Id.
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D.

Extraterritorial Inspection of Chinese Auditors

The growing interdependence of the international market has given rise to the
demand for uniform regulation and enforcement. While a U.S. auditor normally signs audit
reports for Chinese RMCs, the relevant work is often outsourced to its Chinese affiliates
where the client operates. In the wake of the recent rash of accounting scandals, investors
have no way of knowing whether audits can be relied upon. The continuing gaps in oversight
of China-based audit firms put U.S. investors at risk. The grossly inadequate auditing, and the
prevalent fraud, renders the building of an imminent stronger working relationship between
the SEC and PCAOB and their Chinese counterparts, i.e. the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The cross-border oversight would
facilitate meaningful inspection procedures and strengthen monitoring compliance with policy
coordination measures. The PCAOB, the U.S. auditor watchdog, has been frustrated in
searching for common ground on a joint inspection, since the CSRC has not taken action so
far on the ground of the paradoxical violation of China's State Secrets Law and sovereignty.
1.

Subpoena Power

Despite the extraordinarily broad subpoena power in the enabling statutes, 6 the SEC
has encountered numerous procedural and jurisdictional hurdles endemic to litigating in
China. One of the thorniest barriers is that Chinese authorities are unlikely to cooperate in
seeing the U.S. court order honored. Theoretically, the power can reach beyond U.S. borders;
since Longtop's shares were traded in the U.S. 8 7 The SEC could seek the court's issuance of
an order compelling a deposition. Nevertheless, there is simply no way to enforce such an
order upon the entity in China who refuses to comply with U.S. court proceedings. There is
little that can be done if a Chinese firm declines to produce documents, unless the Chinese
government chooses to cooperate. After all, ultimate delivery of a subpoena in China requires
the assistance of local authorities, and there are no means to ensure that these local authorities
will actually deliver a subpoena.
Although a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (MLAA) represents a significant
milestone for bilateral cooperation in law enforcement matters,88 there have been few notable
examples of cooperation between China and the U.S. The MLAA itself contains a number of
provisions that give both parties great flexibility to determine whether assistance should be
granted or denied. 89 The SEC and the CSRC did sign a Memorandum of Understanding

16 Dena Aubin, Analysis: U.S. CourtFightMay not Solve Chinese Accounting Mess, REUTERS, Sept. 13, 2011,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/13/us-sec-deloitte-idUSTRE78C6U220110913.
87 See id Longtop's US depository shares began trading on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) after an
initial public offering (IPO) in 2007. Press Release, SEC. EXCH. COMM'N, SEC Charges China-Based
Longtop Financial
Technologies
for Deficient Filings
(Nov.
10,
2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-241 .htm.
"' Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-China, June 19 2000, art. 3(1)(a)-(c),

T.I.A.S. 13102.
89

See id.
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(MoU).9° The MoU does not create any legally binding obligations, but rather consists largely
of platitudes,91 which is thus unlikely to result in the Chinese authorities ordering the
production of documents. The SEC may attempt to effect service of a subpoena in China
through the procedures set forth in the Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Evidence Convention),92 which may then add additional
steps in the discovery process. However, serving a subpoena via the Hague Evidence
Convention procedures may not ensure a response because China does not consider itself
bound by the articles of Hague Evidence Convention which govern depositions.93 China
insists that cross-border supervision would breach its sovereignty and violate China's existing
laws relating to state secrets.9 4 The discrepancies in the two parties' approaches sets a
backdrop for negotiations between U.S. and Chinese regulators.
2.

Prohibition by Chinese State Secrecy Law

"Western markets rely [generally] upon contracts being enforced by courts and on
investors, suppliers and customers all acting on the basis of audited accounts," 95 while
Chinese business is conducted on the basis of political and social relationships. 96 In China, the
value of a company is tied more tightly to its relationship with the Chinese government than
its investors. The legal redress may often hinge on a company's relationship with officials and
thus outcomes are always uncertain. 97 Toward a market economy, it will more resemble the
West when "the legitimacy of Chinese companies hing[es] upon their own accounts rather
than their ties to the government. 9 8 This has been perfectly reflected in the case of D&T
Shanghai. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the CSRC request accounting firms to
report whether the firms had provided audit work papers, correspondence or other
documentation concerning their audits of Chinese companies to overseas regulators. 99 D&T

90Memorandum of Understanding between the SEC and CSRC Regarding Cooperation, Consultation and the
Provision

of

Technical

Assistance

(April

28,

2004),

available

at

http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia-bilateral/china.pdf.
91See id See also Terms of Reference for Cooperation and Collaboration between the SEC and CSRC (May 2,
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oiabilateral/chinator.pdf.
92 See Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23

U.S.T. 2555. The treaty was negotiated in 1967-1968 and signed in The Hague on 18 March 1970. See id. It
entered into force in 1972. China ratified the Convention on 8 December 1997. See id.
9' Dan Harris, How to Sue a Chinese Company. Part II. Discovery, CHmNA LAW BLOG (Nov. 9, 2010),
http://www.chinalawblog.com/2010/11/how-to-sue-a-chinesecompany_partiidiscovery.html.
94 Michael Cohn, PCAOB Makes Tentative Progresson Chinese Audit Firm Inspections, ACCOUNTiNG TODAY

(Sept. 24,2012), http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/pcaob-china-audit-firm-inspections-64051-1 .html.
9' Mingyi Hung, T.J. Wong & Fang Zhang, Chinese Financial Scandals: When It Matters, ECONOMIST, Aug.
20, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21526407.
96 id.
97

id.

98Id.
99 Rachel Armstrong & Dena Aubin, Exclusive: China Quizzes Audit Giants on Documents, REUTERS, Oct. 19,
2011, availableat http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/19/us-china-accounting-idUSTRE79I16420111019.
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Shanghai's refusal was based upon the fear of repercussions for the violation of China's State
Secret Laws, which forbid disclosure of "state secrets."100
It seems that D&T Shanghai was "caught in the middle of conflicting demands by
two government regulators."10 'Arguably, Deloitte's Chinese branch is a separate legal entity
that should be bound by Chinese law, but it has long benefited from its involvement in
globalization and the securities institutions. The auditor should have a responsibility to
exercise substantial control for the sake of audit quality conducted by its member firms in
China. There is also a legal obligation for Deloitte to comply with an SEC subpoena; refusal
to comply should result in serious legal consequences, 10 2 such as losing its registration with
the PCAOB. An application of a China-based audit firm to become a PCAOB-registered
auditor was rejected in June 2011, due largely to the PCAOB's inability to inspect such
foreign-based auditors. 10 3 Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein observed that China's State Secret Law
is viewed with some skepticism in U.S. courts because these laws "have broad sweep and can
preclude disclosure of a host of [vaguely] defined categories of information. ' 1°4 "The scope
and definition of state secrets ...
are known to be broad and vague, and yet enforcement ...
seems to have been intensified by Chinese authorities. ' 10 5 To say the least, any deference to
State Secrets Laws should be decided by examining the facts on a case-by-case basis. 106
According to the State Secrets Law, only commercial information from "central enterprises",
i.e. one hundred and twenty state-owned companies under the direct supervision by the State
Assets Supervision and Administration (SASAC), could be classified as state secrets.107 So
far, there has not been an issue with the current controversies. 10 8 Evidently, this matter
involves more than a private dispute between two litigants, but rather has an impact on the
ostensible sovereignty issue of China.

10 Isabella Steger, When the Auditor Meets China's 'State Secrets' Law, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2011,
http://blogs.wsj.com/deas/2011/11/02/auditing-in-china-what-construes-a-state-secret. A revised version of
China's State Secrets Law went into effect on 1 October 2010. Laney Zhang, China: State Secrets Law Revised,
LBR.
CONGRESS,
May
7,
2010,
available
at
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc news?disp3 1205401961 text.
101 Isabella Steger, How Should Auditors Handle China's State Secrets Law?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2011,
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/11/02/how-should-auditors-handle-chinas-state-secrets-law/.
102 Press Release, supra note 72.
103 Dune Lawrence & Jesse Hamilton, Hong Kong Auditor Rejected by U.S., BLOOMBERG, June 10, 2011,
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-09/hong-kong-auditor-rejected-by-u-s-.html.
104 Munoz v. China Expert Tech. In., No. 07 Civ. 10531, 2011 WL 5346323, at*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7,2011).
0'5
Jeffrey Kilduff, Seth Aronson, Bingna Guo & Yanhua Lin, Door Opens ofDiscavery on Auditors of Chinabased U.S. Listed Companies in U.S. Securities Lawsuits, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, Nov. 22, 2011,

available at http://www.omm.com/door-opens-for-discovery-on-auditors-of-china-based-us-listed-companiesin-us-securities-lawsuits-12-21-2011/.
106 Id.
107 Stanley Lubman, Unpacking the Law Around the Chinese Reverse Takeover Mess, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24,
2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/014/unpacking-the-law-around-the-chinese-reverse-takeovermess/.
108 Id.
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3.

Is sovereignty a paradoxical defence?

China's inaction on oversight is attributable to a difference in approach between
Chinese and U.S. regulators. "The Chinese government has long rejected American requests
to investigate Chinese auditing companies on the grounds of protecting China's
sovereignty."10 9 The demands of two governments seem to be potentially in conflict with such
an issue. The U.S. regulators encounter problems trying to obtain reliable information based
in China. "The SEC is wading into untested territory as it tries to compel [China-based
auditors] to hand over documents." 10 Chinese MoF and the CSRC are reluctant to default to
the PCAOB to evaluate the work of over fifty PCAOB-registered audit firms, including the
affiliates of the Big Four accounting firms. They emphasize political credibility, even at the
expense of transparent and accurate financial reporting. In this vein, sovereignty should not be
used as a cover for inadequate financial transparency.1 It is unlikely to be justified that
China's national interests, in the name of sovereignty, are genuinely at stake. Theoretically, "a
global economy puts a lot of limits on national sovereignty,1 1 2 and U.S. regulators must
"work to convince the Chinese that conducting joint inspections of auditing firms will not
infringe on China's authority." 1 3 "U.S. regulators appear to be on strong footing in a legal
battle over the Chinese auditor's work paper" 1 4 so as to "resolve [the] widening international
accounting mess." 1 5 The interest in obtaining D&T Shanghai's documents "far outweigh[s]
China's [ostensible] secrecy interests." '1 6 The gaps render it enormously significant for U.S.
and Chinese regulatory agencies to work out a protocol to resolve the controversies and put in
place the joint inspections of PCAOB-registered firms.
4.

Is a joint inspection the cure?

"As in the case of global audits themselves, reliance on high-level summaries of
work performed by another regulator presents an unmitigated hand-off risk."'1 17 On February
24, 2010, the SEC issued a statement reaffirming its commitment to "the goal of a single set
of high-quality global accounting standards."118 These standards are vital to facilitate investor
protection through intersecting and overlapping regulatory oversight of global audits.1 19
Toward deeper cooperation for mutual benefits of the rigorous and joint auditor oversight, the
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PCAOB and its China counterparts have been working on protocols, 120 thereby creating a
forum that enables joint inspections to go forward the way they are in Europe. 121 The
negotiations have not yet culminated in any agreements. The proposed joint-inspection has
raised significant challenges, which virtually goes well beyond keeping PCAOB inspectors
out of China. So far, the PCAOB has been "unable to convince the Chinese [regulator] to

grant its inspectors the access they need to ensure that auditors are performing their duties."1 22
The SEC's investigations are being stalled by their "inability to gather information in
China., 12 Thus, there currently is no reliable or effective tool to help U.S. regulators gather
evidence from China. 124 Such inability has considerably weakened investor protections in
the U.S.
Actually, China has a significant interest in curtailing the accounting scandals.
Chinese RMCs have experienced a sharp decline in the securities market and "had $4.1
billion wiped off their market value [in the first half of 2011] amid a wave of auditor
resignations and fraud allegations by short-sellers" 12 alongside SEC and PCAOB's
investigations. 126 Chinese authorities need to make investors comfortable with the quality and
extent of the audits. 127 The PCAOB's failure to reach an inspection agreement with the CSRC
may make it more difficult for Chinese companies to go public in the U.S. The listing of
Chinese companies may be substantially vulnerable if the accounting firms have to
withdraw. 12 The accounting scandals have raised the critical issue again as to whether
companies, not subject to U.S. rules, should be selling shares in the U.S. It is not without
concerns from U.S. courts that companies whose audit documents are outside their reach are
allowed to list shares on U.S. exchanges. 129 Uncoincidentally, the SEC has become more

120

Sarah N. Lynch, Audit Watchdog Aims for China Deal by Late 2012, REUTERS, Jan. 11, 2012, available at

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/ I/us-pcaob-idUSTRE80A SU201201 11.
121 See EUROPEAN COMM'N INTERNAL MKT. & SERVICES DG, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 027, at
1 (Feb. 9, 2009); see also Jesse Hamilton, U.S. RegulatorsPush Chinese to Resume Auditor-Inspection Talks,
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 23, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-23/u-s-regulators-pushchinese-to-resume-auditor-inspection-talks.html.
122 Lynch, supra note 120.
121 China Said to Discuss Allowing SEC Probes of Mainland Firmsfor the First Time, BLOOMBERG, July 5,
2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-05/china-said-to-discuss-allowing-sec-probes-ofmainland-firms-for-first-time.html [hereinafter "Allowing SEC Probes"].
124 See Anna McCormack, The United States, China, and Extradition:Ready for the Next Step?, 12 N. Y. U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 445,465-66 (2008).
125 Allowing SEC Probes, supra note 123. "The Bloomberg Chinese Reverse Mergers Index, an equity index
that tracks the performance of nearly 80 Chinese-based firms that have completed reverse mergers, declined in
value by 44.4% in the first six months of 2011." James C. Lin & Bonnie Chan, Davis Polk & Wardwell, LLP,
Presentation at the Second Securities Law Colloquium: The Problems of Chinese Companies on US Securities
Exchanges
12
(Nov.
25,
2011),
available
at
http://www.law.cuhk.edu.hk/research/cfred/download/CFRED's_SecondSecuritiesLawColloquiumDavis_
Polk.pdf
126 See PATTON BoGGs, supra note 23. "As a likely consequence of these compounding problems, shares of
Chinese RMCs collectively fell approximately 50% during the first six months of 2011 ." Id.
127 Aubin, supra note 86.
128 See Shalal-Esa & Lynch, supra note 82.
129 See Aubin, supra note 86.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol12/iss1/3

18

Bu: The Chinese Reverse Merger Companies (RMCs) Reassessed: Promising
THE CHINESE REVERSE MERGER COMPANIES (RMCS) REASSESSED

aggressive in revoking some securities registrations of Chinese RMCs.130 With its ambitious
expansion into global markets for foreign financing, China cannot afford to resist such access
in the longer run. It is also suggested that "Chinese auditors of financial reports used by U.S.
investors ought to be subject to the same discovery obligations as an auditor here in the
United States.

131

As mentioned above, at the current stage, the domestic courts are not effective tools.
"Unless and until Chinese regulators and U.S. regulators agree to work cooperatively on
enforcement issues, investors should not assume the same level of comfort in relying upon
financial statements and disclosures of [RMCs] as they do traditional [IPOs]. ' 132 To combat
the growing distrust of the reported financials of RMCs, there seems to have been only one
viable option so far to toughen Exchanges' listing standards via the SEC.
E. New Roadblocks to Going Public through Reverse Mergers
"The PCAOB's inability to conduct joint inspections of [China-based] audit firms
weakens investor protections in the U.S. and abroad." 133 The RMCs' widespread fraudulent
behaviors protrude the imminence more than ever for "increased transparency, strong risk
management, and broad financial oversight." 13 4 With an aim to restore confidence in the
"embattled segment of public companies," the Exchanges have placed tighter restrictions on
RMCs prior to their listings. 35 SEC has subsequently approved heightened stock exchange
listing standards so as to maintain fair and orderly markets. 3 6 A Chinese RMC must trade for
a "seasoning period" and meet a minimum per share price requirement before being eligible
for listing on the Exchanges. 3 7 The requirement for additional SEC filings is designed to
strengthen investors' confidence by improving the reliability of the reported financial
statements and "aimed at increasing transparency for market138participants and discouraging
inappropriate behavior on the part of [RMCs] and promoters."
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1.

Seasoning Period

"A 'seasoning period' would lead to an increased likelihood that a [RMC] has 'a
more bonafide shareholder base,' and will help assure that the initial listing bid price was not
obtained through manipulative trading practices."13 9 Chinese RMCs cannot be listed unless
they have filed audited financial statements covering at least a full fiscal year, commenced
after the filing of specified initial documentation. 14 The applying RMC must complete a
"one-year 'seasoning period' by trading in the U.S. over-the-counter market or on another
1 41
regulated U.S. or foreign exchange following the [consummation of the] reverse merger."
The new rules are intended to provide investors with easier access to financial reports issued
by RMCs. All material information will have been made public and simultaneously
demonstrate the RMC's ability to meet its filing and disclosure obligations. This period will
also "allow for additional market and regulatory scrutiny of [the RMCs] ' 1 42 and provide time
to detect and address any potential financial irregularities or internal control weaknesses that
"could otherwise preclude listing eligibility."1 43 "Such [a] period will provide greater
assurance that the [RMCs'] SEC reports are accurate and reliable since auditors and the
company will have reviewed at least several quarters of the company[ies'] operating results
prior to listing." 144Furthermore, "the seasoning period will increase the integrity of the
[RMCs'] financial and operations related reporting and allow auditors and company
management to adequately evaluate and address accounting irregularities and internal controls
deficiencies. 1 45
2.

Minimum Stock Price

The RMC must maintain a requisite minimum share price for a sustained period of
at least 30 of 60 trading days immediately before its listing application and the Exchange's
subsequent decision to list the company. 146 This is intended to "make it more difficult for
[RMCs] to devise [quick and] manipulative schemes to inflate their stock price for purposes
of meeting the Exchanges' minimum share price requirements." 147 The minimum stock price
requirement generally does not apply if the RMC has satisfied the "seasoning period"
requirement and "has filed at least four annual reports with the [SEC] which each contain all
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required audited financial statements for a full fiscal year." 148 Notably, even if a company
meets these requirements, the Exchanges may nevertheless deny listing based on their
authority to apply additional or more stringent criteria in order to maintain the quality of and
public confidence in the market, to prevent fraud and manipulation. 149 The Exchanges reserve
such an authority at their discretion and even deny listings based on a case-by-case basis upon
disclosure of a material weakness in RMCs' internal controls. The heightened listing
standards are consistent with the provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, requiring
that the rules of the national stock exchanges be designed to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices, and to generally protect investors and the public interest.15°
The Exchanges' discretionary powers are conducive to promoting just and equitable
principles of trade, and to protecting investors.
3.

Impact on Chinese RMCs

The additional requirements provide more transparency and reduce the level of risk,
serving as a roadblock for, and deterring, suspicious transactions. The proactive measures
help reinstate public confidence among potential investors by creating "reliable reporting
'
track records."151
Meanwhile, the new rules "raise the level of regulatory security on RMCs]
and delay their access to U.S. exchanges."' 152 In substance, they reduce the benefits
traditionally associated with going public through a reverse merger, i.e. greater speed and
lesser expenses, and thus "reduce the ease of accessibility to U.S. markets through a reverse
merger." 53 There might be some concern about losing Chinese firms to another stock market,
but this would not result in granting exemption from higher listing standards. However, the
reverse merger will continue to be a viable alternative for Chinese companies seeking access
to capital markets in the West. Some brokers are even attempting to get Chinese firms into
Europe, such as in Germany and the United Kingdom. China's weak corporate governance
practices may be exported to the foreign listing environment. 1 4 The additional criteria, which
came at a time of heightened scrutiny, would adequately protect investors with respect to
RMCs' potential dangers. Subject to a more robust legal regime, Chinese RMCs should be
cognizant of these enhanced rules and thus need to manage their accounting books according
to higher standards. Failure to conduct adequate due diligence could expose them to
unnecessary risks. Put differently, the RMCs should be well aware "of the risks they face and
'
more honest about their financial statements." 155
"Their reports must fairly present their
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financial position...[and both] deficiencies and material weaknesses in internal controls." 156
Nevertheless, the inherently troubling issue still remains as to how the Exchanges can
adequately confirm the accuracy of those Chinese affiliates' audits if the U.S. regulators are
denied access to accounting information on the RMCs that may have engaged in fraudulent
conduct. It remains to be seen whether these heightened listing standards will eliminate the
alleged fraudulent and manipulative practices that have been committed by the RMCs.

CONCLUSION
Many Chinese companies have been increasingly pursuing a reverse merger so as to
facilitate its access to the capital markets in a manner that is perceived as quicker and less
costly than a traditional IPO. It allows Chinese companies to avoid the scrutiny of their
finances and operations, and to avoid having its prospectus reviewed by the SEC. Since
RMCs have not typically been subjected to the enhanced scrutiny associated with an IPO,
concerns have arisen about the accuracy of the RMC's financial statements. Some auditors for
Chinese RMCs resigned because of concerns about management misrepresentations and
falsified audit documentation. Thus, Chinese RMCs haven been targeted by regulators, as
well as investors, for purported securities and accounting fraud. The existing rules aimed at
ensuring the eligibility of companies for listing are not adequate and have failed to protect
investors from huge risks. Due to the ostensible sovereignty issue and conflicts with China's
State Secrets Law, the PCAOB remains unable to inspect auditors that perform or participate
in audits of companies that access capital through U.S. markets, but reside in China. As a
gaping hole in investor protection, the lack of joint inspection has caused significant concerns
for Chinese companies attempting to go public by way of a reverse merger. The greatest
solution probably lies with improving the Exchanges' listing standards. The new rules
establish more rigorous conditions that companies, going public through a reverse merger,
must meet before they can be listed on the three major U.S. exchanges. Chinese RMCs must
walt for a one-year seasoning period to elapse and maintain a minimum share price for a
sustained period of time before they are permitted to list on a U.S. exchange. These additional
requirements are designed to strengthen investors' confidence in, and ability to rely upon,
RMCs' audited financial statements. Perhaps the combination of stricter listing requirements,
enhanced SEC watchdog efforts, and increased investor scrutiny will be all that is needed to
fix the problem. Only time will tell whether these proposed solutions will succeed in reducing
the instances of fraudulent reverse merger companies.
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